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The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait appeared to dispel, for 
the time being at least, any illusions that the Gulf Arab 
states may have held about making progress towards a 
credible security arrangement. The Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) had taken increasing pains since its 
inception in 1981 to reassure its citizens, and remind 
its two large northern neighbours, Iran and Iraq, that 
the peninsula was not defenceless. 
The creation of some form of substantial security regime, 
even if not on the same scale as the highly centralised 
Iraqi military, should have been possible to achieve in 
the region. At least the incentive should have been 
there, given the historic Iraqi threat to Kuwait, and the 
likelihood that the Iran-Iraq conflict would not go on 
forever, freeing both these major powers to return to 
meddling in the affairs of the lower Gulf. 
Since the beginning of the Iran-Iraq conflict in 1980, 
Kuwaiti rulers exercised what little bargaining power 
they had to dampen the temptation of either of their 
powerful neighbours to absorb the small sheikhdom. They 
clearly had little faith in a GCC military capability, 
and resorted to buying protection. GCC military 
expenditure in the 1980s was substantial, but by 1990 the 
money had not bought a meaningful deterrent (1). 
While Baghdad and Tehran were at loggerheads, Kuwait's 
position remained relatively secure, despite occasional 
2 
'accidental' air raids by Iran against Kuwaiti territory, 
designed no doubt to remind the Gulf sheikhdoms that 
their support for Iraq could prove costly. Neither 
Saddam Hussein nor Ayatollah Khomeini had any compelling 
political or economic motive to widen their highly 
personalised war. So, the infant Gee had the best part 
of a decade to put together a capable force. To this 
end, amidst much fanfare, Gee forces carried out a series 
of large scale annual military exercises on the Arabian 
peninsula, and gave increasing public prominence to high-
level defence cooperation. 
The Gee should have been able to achieve better results 
in the time available. The total population of the Gee 
states, even minus non-indigeonous workers, together with 
their enormous financial resources could support a 
reasonable defence force (including the extensive use by 
Saudi Arabia of, for example, Pakistani troops (2». 
Even given the understandable problems involved in 
coordinating joint defence programs, the Gee states had 
ten years' clear warning, and appeared to accept the high 
possibility of, a major military threat in the region. 
This paper suggests that the lack of results stems 
primarily from the Gulf states not having weaned 
themselves off their dependence on an outside power to 
guarantee their security. When the United Kingdom 
announced its decision in 1968 to pullout of the Gulf, 
the United States was unprepared to fill the 
3 
r psychological and security power vacuum (3). Although 
the United States had been taking over gradually from 
Britain in the Gulf since the 1940s, "it was not fully 
prepared to accept direct responsibility for the Gulf and 
peninsula, let alone take up Britain's shield" (4). 
The Gulf states were left to ponder an uncertain security 
future with little warning - the UK had only just 
provided assurances to the region that it had no 
immediate plans to withdraw its protection (5). 
Moreover, the domestic British political debacle over the 
I' 
decision to quit the Gulf ensured an untidy withdrawal, 
I leaving no framework for any future security arrangements 
( 6) • 
J B Kelly, in his colourful condemnation in 1981 of 
Western policy in the Gulf, noted that between 1970 and 
1971 the British Government destroyed any chance that 
there might have been to establish viable post-withdrawal 
III security arrangements in the Gulf; "by conniving at 
Persian occupation of [the islands of] Abu Musa and the 
!all 
Tunbs, and by endeavouring to procure the surrender of 
Abu Dhabi territory to Saudi Arabia, the Heath 
administration had ... debased the value of any defence 
~ undertaking that might have been given the fledgling UAE" 
'I  \~ I 
( 7 ) • 
~ 
Of course, the UK withdrawal did not amount to a major 
military exercise : 
~ 
~! 
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The impact of withdrawal from the Gulf was more 
substantial in political terms since it necessitated 
the formulation of an independent political 
framework for the small emirates along the Arab 
littoral, but the real impact was essentially 
psychological. Britain had served as judge, arbiter, 
administrator and, of course, protector of this 
littoral for well over a century. Departure in 1971 
was tantamount to removal of the safety net. (8) 
So, the lower Gulf was left to do as best it could, in 
the absence, however, of any clear external threat to its 
security in the early 1970s (9). East-West detente may 
have given the newly cast-off protectorates and their 
peninsula neighbours a breathing space, but it also 
compounded their false sense of security. Saudi Arabia, 
although not under explicit UK protection, had 
effectively relied on the UK presence in the Gulf. 
The vulnerability in 1990 of Saudi Arabia to external 
threat, and the inadequacy of its own defences, were made 
plain by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (10). 
It is clear that the West and the nervous Gulf states 
bear some responsibility for encouraging Iraq to develop 
its offensive capacity. The West failed to look beyond 
the end of the conflict with Iran, partly through 
American obsession with the threat of radical Islam, to 
ensure the containment of that capacity. The southern 
Gulf states, although anxious over the burgeoning 
arsenals to their north, continued to finance the Iraqi 
war effort, partly on the basis of historical Persian-
5 
Ii 
Arab antipathy, but also from understandable fears of 
radical Islam, and the size of Iran. By bankrolling the 
Iraqis, and not presenting too hostile a front, the Gulf 
'I 
states hoped to keep themselves out of the fighting. 
,~ 
During the 1970s, despite two major oil confrontations, 
the formation of the GCC, and tightening of OPEC's 
political control over its oil, the Gulf states in the 
end believed that the West would not tolerate the loss of 
a primary energy resource to a hostile power, and would 
therefore continue to provide a military safety net . 
. '.! 
Their belief has, of course, been justified by the 
I! massive Western response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
The security dilemma following 1971 for the West was how 
best to secure its interests without a tangible presence, 
or open invitation to intervene, in the region. One way 
would have been to establish a large standing military 
presence. This, however, was politically unacceptable to 
11 most Gulf states. The other would have been to actively 
encourage the GCC's military capability. But the West, 
I~ and particularly the United States, had difficulties with 
this. 
~ Firstly, it appeared to pose a threat to Israel (and 
1 
consequently would certainly excite considerable domestic 
opposition in Washington). Secondly, it would mean 
transferring responsibility for protecting the oil fields 
~ 
to theocratic sheikhdoms less concerned with the 
~ 
I~ 
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geostrategic priorities of the West than self-
preservation. The result was unsatisfactory for all 
sides, involving a piecemeal approach to security and a 
chronic inability to devise comprehensive and lasting 
security arrangements. 
This paper will examine some significant events and 
aspects of Saudi and GCC policy formulation in the 1970s 
and 1980s, with a view to identifying how security 
complacency became inbuilt. This was a period during 
which Saudi Arabia had to cope with staggering economic 
change, and had to face a bewildering array of new 
security challenges. This paper also looks at the 
motivation behind Saudi security decision-making, 
concluding that Riyadh has pursued remarkably consistent 
external policies, founded on a domestic predilection for 
consensus politics, and a coherent approach to its own 
security requirements - not always well understood in the 
West. 
A good deal of the literature on Saudi Arabia, Gulf 
security and relations with the West has been written 
with a political agenda in mind, to prescribe policy 
changes which will enhance the West's ability to form 
long-term and beneficial strategic relationships in the 
region. Analyses of Saudi Arabia's security concerns 
have concentrated on how best to implement Western 
policies to secure Western interests - that is, security 
of oil resources, containment of the former Soviet Union, 
7 
and maintenance of an acceptable level of internal 
stability (intra and inter-state) to enable the first two 
goals to be pursued successfully (11). 
Some attention in the literature is paid to the 
'worldview' of the different Gulf states, to help explain 
the difficulties they might have in reaching agreement on 
security issues. Quandt, for example, recommended that 
these difficulties must be overcome if the region is to 
attain viability in self-defence, which is in the overall 
interests of the West. The United States has paid lip 
service to these prescriptions, notably in its public 
enthusiasm for the GCC. 
A great deal of optimism has surrounded the creation of 
the GCC, and its member states often express hopes of 
achieving a NATO like defence structure with an EC like 
free market. One writer views "the true significance of 
the GCC ... in its potential as a building block in the 
construction of a global Islamic political society" (12). 
This is a common and not unreasonable theme; that there 
exists a strong convergence of security interests between 
the West and the 'moderate' Gulf states. But reality has 
dictated caution; apart from the above-mentioned Western 
wariness over real Arab military control over vital oil 
resources, a powerful military in Saudi Arabia would pose 
an internal threat to the ruling Al Saud family, which 
8 
has been careful to devolve military power in the 
kingdom, especially after an abortive coup in 1969. 
It is difficult to see how it is in Western interests to 
further militarise an already over-militarised region, 
unless its choice of ally were to be impeccable. The 
experience with both Iran and Iraq suggests that this is 
a dangerous assumption. So, although the prospects for 
Saudi internal stability and security seem good for the 
next decade, the West would be wise not to set too much 
store by developing a 'special relationship' with such a 
politically and culturally alien state as Saudi Arabia. 
The alliance can never be completely reliable. 
The best that can be hoped for, or pursued, therefore, is 
a modus vivendi, based on the convergence of temporary 
economic, and strategic interests. 
Anything more ambitious runs the risk of over-optimism, 
which has to a large extent characterised Washington's 
Gulf security policies, thereby reducing the West's 
options in scenarios such as that which led to the 1991 
Gulf war. This paper focuses on a limited number of 
foreign policy and security decisions made by Riyadh and 
the other Gulf states, demonstrating some of the basic 
incompatibilities and misunderstandings between Western 
and Saudi perceptions of security. 
9 
Included also is a section on the Saudi ruling family's 
idea of security, which examines some of its security 
decisions, both internal and external, for indications of 
consistency. Saudi foreign policy decision-making has 
been remarkably consistent, but within its own order of 
security-related priorities, which are not the same as 
those of the industrialised West. 
Riyadh's security focus during this period has been 
largely internal, and this focus has influenced heavily 
its external policy decision-making - both in process, by 
proceeding with caution and seeking consensus, and in the 
substance of decisions which have reflected domestic 
priorities. 
Necessarily, much is left out of such a discussion. 
There is little reference to inter-state rivalries on the 
peninsula, which are an important component in the GCC's 
inability to cooperate more fully. There is also little 
reference to Moscow's strategic priorities, or to the 
wider dimensions of the superpower rivalry which, in 
particular, caused the United states to adopt extreme 
policies throughout the 1980s. The paper concentrates on 
those issues which seem to have most impact on policy 
formulation in the region itself. 
The period from the early 1970s to the late 1980s is 
treated with a degree of artificial homogeneity. While I 
have chosen examples to demonstrate policy consistency, 
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or highlight a particular facet of policy motivation, 
from either decade, there is a substantial difference 
between the post and pre-1979 Gulf political and 
strategic scene. Even the oil shock of 1973 did not 
really shake the United States out of its post-Vietnam 
Guam Doctrine complacency, but the Iranian revolution and 
the invasion of Afghanistan certainly did. 
It is not, however, the purpose of this paper to go over 
the familiar ground of comparing one decade to the other. 
Rather, both periods, with their differing backdrops, 
provide examples of long-term consistency in Saudi 
decision-making. It is quite remarkable that, despite 
the radical change in strategic perceptions, from 
Washington as well as in the Gulf, a decade of activism 
in defence in the region still could not prevent the 
invasion of Kuwait. 
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Oil 
The use of the oil weapon following the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
war demonstrated to a complacent US Government "that 
l 
business and politics in the Persian Gulf could not 
safely be separated from each other" (1). Production 
cutbacks by the Gulf states, in addition to the boycott, 
"permitted OPEC to quadruple the price of oil" (2). In 
1978-79, the Iranian revolution created further 
I II 
'.! 
opportunities to raise the price. OPEC, following the 
·'1 I II. spot market, moved the price up to about $32 per barrel 
, 
by mid-1980. (3) 
In less than a decade, "the entire production and pricing 
system of international oil was transformed, as was the 
perception of United States and Western interests in the 
Persian Gulf" (4). The impact in the West, psychological 
as much as economic, was profound. 
But the 1973 embargo should not have come as quite a 
large psychological shock to the West as it did. In the 
lead-up to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Saudi Arabia was 
If 
forging closer links with Egypt, and was increasingly 
influenced by Cairo's political agenda. King Faisal was 
probably the one Arab leader "trusted by Sadat and Asad" 
I with details of the October attack against Israel. In Sadat, Saudi Arabia recognised a counter-revolutionary 
.~ 
force which they welcomed after the strains put on the 
1 
Saudi-Egyptian relationship under Nasser. After the 1973 
, 
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war, Egypt and Saudi Arabia agreed to "discourage 
practices subversive of the status quo" and commenced 
armament production cooperation. For some time, the 
Saudis had baulked at employing the oil weapon against 
the United States because of the potential damage to the 
relationship with Washington - and their final agreement 
to use it was critical to the implementation of the 
embargoeS). 
The Saudis made a decision which the West found hard to 
understand in terms other than political weakness or 
economic greed. This error, or lack of sophistication in 
assessing Saudi motivation, has consistently prevented 
Washington from anticipating Saudi policy. 
Riyadh, when faced with the choice, made a decision based 
on its own perception of its long-term security interests 
in the region; not to please a superpower trying to 
juggle a defence commitment to Israel with oil resource 
security. The Saudis, well aware that the United States 
was capable of, and probably actively considering, 
military intervention in the Gulf if the oil resources 
were threatened seriously, chose to take that risk rather 
than be perceived in the region as an American stooge 
( 6) • It was not much of a risk, as the Saudis were soon 
bargaining with Kissinger over the embargo, and the 
United States was not in danger of being crippled by lack 
of oil supplies. 
13 
That Sadat went too far, in Saudi eyes, by recognising 
Israel in 1975 underlines the local and regional focus of 
Saudi security policy. Again, Riyadh opted for Arab 
consensus over the advantages of a close bilateral link 
with Cairo. Indeed, it was precisely Egypt's potential 
to assist Saudi Arabia in pursuing moderate policies 
which attracted Riyadh in the first place to develop a 
closer link. An outcast Egypt, seen as a traitor to the 
wider Arab nation, no matter how moderate and anti-
revolutionary, was not much use to the Saudis. 
In 1981, William Quandt, dismissing a "simplistic" 
economics vs politics model, isolated a number of key 
factors which could help explain the rationale behind 
critical oil decisions. These were market conditions, 
revenue requirements, technical problems (for example the 
relative efficiency of producing light and heavy crudes), 
internal politics, expectations of future global energy 
requirements, OPEC pressures (particularly on the swing 
producer), associated gas (industrial development 
requiring a certain level of oil production to provide 
the needed gas), relations with the United States, and 
the Palestinian problem (7). 
A plausible argument can be made out that anyone or a 
combination of the above factors would account 
substantially for any given policy decision. For 
example, the November and December production cutbacks in 
1973 may have stemmed from a complexity of factors in 
14 
Riyadh's thinking, whereas the embargo decision was 
predominantly influenced by the fairly straightforward 
political need to demonstrate Arab solidarity (8). 
The chief drawback with Quandt's analysis is a tendency 
to impose a particularly Western hierarchy on Saudi 
policy formulation priorities, in an attempt to ascribe 
to Saudi Arabia a methodology in decision-making which 
would be readily understood in Washington. Quandt 
himself goes on, while examining several critical Saudi 
production and pricing policies, to conclude that caution 
remained the hallmark of Saudi decision making, relying 
on achievement of consensus in the Al Saud family, tinged 
with a common sense awareness of the limits of the 
kingdom's power (9). This achievement of consensus and 
unwillingness to pursue policies which do not pay a 
direct tangible security dividend have characterised 
Saudi policy for decades. They often override influences 
which would be critical in Western decision-making. 
Another analysis helps to explain Riyadh's surprise over 
the strong US reaction to the 1973 embargo. What seemed 
to the Saudis a relatively transparent exercise in 
protecting their own regional vital interests, by 
demonstrating their Arab credentials, elicited a much 
more negative response in Washington than Riyadh might 
have expected. 
I: 
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Before 1973, American oil companies had been warning the 
Administration that OAPEC (10) was serious about an oil 
embargo if the United States continued what they 
perceived as an unbalanced policy towards the Arab-
Israeli dispute. Former CIA Adviser Wilbur Crane 
Eveland, writing in 1980, noted that OAPEC had made it 
clear that before 1973 "restrictions on oil exports would 
be directed solely at inducing Israel to comply with the 
UN's dictates and to recognize the "rights" of the 
Palestinians" (11). 
Eveland, noting that the United States Government had 
long employed "trade restrictions and economic sanctions 
... to support foreign-policy objectives and to punish 
regimes whose policies" had offended it, found the 
American response to the OAPEC embargo and cutbacks to be 
extreme. Eveland went on to suggest that, in 1979, 
President Carter sought to salvage his sagging popularity 
in the polls by accepting advice to "attribute to the 
Arab oil-producing states all of America's economic 
problems". Eveland noted also that the American reaction 
ignored other significant factors in the functioning of 
the oil market. 
There was little relationship between "OPEC's price 
ceiling of $23.50 a barrel ... and what Americans paid 
for gasoline and fuel oil" - the spot market sometimes 
ranged as high as $40. Also, the Arabian-American Oil 
Company (ARAMCO) partners in the United States bought oil 
16 
at preferential rates, but passed nothing on to the 
consumers - the embargo and cutbacks were not doing the 
US oil companies much damage. OPEC was also justified in 
cutting back production to protect its own economic 
interests - with the oil price pegged to a flagging US 
dollar, and OPEC investments in America losing value, it 
was only in keeping with American domestic practice to 
leave the oil in the ground until it appreciated in value 
(12). 
Eveland's analysis gives the moral benefit of the doubt 
to OPEC members in his attempt to describe the failure of 
US policy. Although casting the Arab oil producers in a 
rather rosy light, the point is that the US reaction to 
the events of 1973 was out of proportion with the damage 
caused by the embargo and cutbacks. It is little wonder 
that Riyadh, otherwise eager to strengthen and broaden 
its relationship with the West to accelerate industrial 
development, would continue to be wary of any entangling 
alliances. 
The first half of the 1980s produced little change in the 
general thrust of Saudi oil policy, which had been to 
act, as far as was practicable in the 1970s, as 'swing 
producer'. Production was cut in 1985 to 3.4 million bpd 
during the glut, but since then Riyadh has found its role 
a little more difficult to manage, in the light of 
"growing cash-flow problems" and cheating by other OPEC 
members on production quotas (13). This has placed 
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additional strain on the decision-making process in 
Riyadh. 
A major factor throughout the 1980s in Saudi oil policy, 
was "the need to use petroleum export revenues to place 
the economy on a high-growth trajectory that will 
eventually lead to self-sustaining private-sector growth" 
(14). The Saudis have striven to achieve a uniformity of 
income to finance development. They are conscious of the 
speed with which overseas reserves are drawn down if 
global production and pricing fluctuations interfere with 
their ambitious development plans. Achievement of such a 
sophisticated economic structure has been slow in coming, 
with oil still accounting for the bulk of export 
earnings. Saudi leaders have been caught between the 
need to achieve development, but to do it without overt 
Westernisation of the society and economy. 
This is nowhere better exemplified than in the 
restrictions placed on the operation of truly free market 
conditions within the kingdom, without which it seems 
doubtful that a reasonable level of productive private 
sector growth can be anticipated. The most egregious 
examples of this are to be found in the conditions for 
foreign companies operating in compulsory joint ventures, 
into which the Saudi partner contributes little more than 
a name and a national status. The political push, 
however, for modernisation without Westernisation, and 
for the 'Saudi-isation' of the workforce, has become the 
I 
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guiding rule of Saudi development - again, it is 
I, 
consensus which is important, regardless of the apparent 
contradiction in the policy. 
" 
It is this balance, between pursuit of internal policies 
which have the backing of the key actors in the Al Saud 
family, and policies which do not isolate Saudi Arabia in 
OPEC and the region, which underpins the decision-making 
process (15). 
One decision which demonstrated well the close interplay 
between Saudi domestic and foreign policies was the 
dismissal by King Fahd of Oil Minister Yamani in October 
1986. 
Yamani, who had been chosen by King Faisal in 1962, had 
established himself by the late 1970s as the country's 
expert and spokesman on petroleum matters, with a high 
international profile. The royal family came to rely 
upon his advice, as well as upon his negotiating skills 
within OPEC and with the West. 
~ 
11 
During a crisis in the oil market in 1984, Yamani 
objected to various barter arrangements for oil 
(including the infamous 'oil-for-Boeings' deal), probably 
alarmed that such transactions, designed mainly to 
II, "channel commissions to the constituencies of the Defence 
~ 
Minister and to other princes, would jeopardise the 
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kingdom's credibility in the oil market and its financial 
stability" (16). 
Yamani, a Hejazi technocrat -from the west of the country, 
had already lost popularity in Riyadh as more and more 
power was concentrated, after Faisal's assassination in 
1975, in the hands of the branch of the royal family in 
charge in the capital, and also in the hands of its own 
new "intelligentsia" from the central Nejd region around 
Riyadh (17). 
Yamani had emerged from the 1973 oil embargo and 
production cuts as a powerful asset to the Saudi 
leadership. Nonetheless, the danger signs were evident 
in the ensuing oil glut that he would find it difficult 
to maintain complete control of OPEC production and 
pricing policy by having Saudi Arabia play the eternal 
swing producer. Yamani's approach was sound, but his 
credibility in Riyadh was dependent upon the success of 
what was to become an impossible mission - to balance the 
economic and foreign policy interests of the country with 
the political interests of the royal family. 
The second oil shock of 1979 helped produce the 1981-83 
world recession, during which Saudi oil production fell 
from 9.8 to 5.1 million bpd (18). The forecasts for OEeD 
growth were bleak, and alternative sources of energy, 
including the 'unknown quantity' of the Soviet Siberian 
pipeline, added uncertainty to Saudi financial planning. 
20 
To make matters worse, non-OPEC oil production increased 
sharply from late 1973 to mid 1985 (OPEC's share of 
global production over this period fell from about 56% to 
34%). 
Yamani was certain to attract some criticism at home, 
even if he could hardly be blamed for other countries' 
energy policies. In Riyadh, it was easy to point the 
finger at the swing producer policy as responsible for 
forcing the kingdom to pay for the unfair market 
practices of its competitors; "that the expansion of non-
OPEC production should have taken place precisely because 
the kingdom was attempting to stabilise the market 
through output and price restraint was especially galling 
to Saudi leaders" (19). 
By June 1985, Saudi Arabia abandoned its role as swing 
producer - Riyadh simply could not afford to keep 
reducing production, keeping to a set of guidelines which 
were failing to regulate non-OPEC production, and were 
failing also to compensate for "concealed price cuts and 
production increases" within OPEC itself (20). 
Unfortunately for the Oil Minister, efforts to restore 
some semblance of order to the market (and Saudi Arabia's 
room to manoeuvre within it) caused prices to dive 
initially to around $8 a barrel. Ostensibly, Yamani was 
sacked for disloyalty by ignoring instructions from King 
Fahd to advise OPEC that Riyadh's 'bottom line' price was 
21 
considerably higher than $8. Yamani may have technically 
overstepped the bounds of his authority, but not, from a 
Western viewpoint, sufficiently so as to warrant the 
dismissal of the kingdom's most able representative to 
its most economically vital world forum. Yamani had good 
reason to believe that he had some latitude in bargaining 
at OPEC, and had obtained full support for his policies 
from The King and the royal Consultative Council (21). 
Yamani's replacement, another Hejazi technocrat, has not 
emulated Yamani's personal style, and has not sought the 
same level of influence over Saudi oil decisions. He has 
posed no threat to stability within the Al Saud family, 
which is the key to Yamani's dismissal. The family had 
started to feel under the energetic former Oil Minister 
that control of the country's economic future was 
slipping from them, despite Yamani's impeccable record of 
competence and loyalty to his employers. 
Yamani was dismissed not because he was subverting the 
country's economic and foreign policy interests, but 
because his continued presence as Oil Minister threatened 
the internal cohesion within the Saudi royal family. 
It is the maintenance of this cohesion which has stood 
the House of Saud in good stead through a number of 
crises (such as Faisal's assassination in 1975). It 
makes for a narrow definition, however, of national 
security interests and leads to an obsession with 
I· 
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internal political threats. This preoccupation has had a 
continuous impact on national policy decision-making. 
Internal Security and Stability 
In formulating foreign policy, Saudi Arabia has often 
been more vitally preoccupied with repercussions of its 
policies back home, where popular opposition is likely to 
be expressed violently. Of course, oil income provides 
substantial material benefits to many Saudis (including 
first class medical and other welfare facilities, 
subsidised housing and virtually individual tax free 
earnings and expenditures - all of which increase 
pressure on Riyadh to meet physical expectations). 
While this diminishes the likelihood of any serious 
challenge to the royal family's authority, the House of 
Saud is peculiarly sensitive to rumblings of discontent, 
having seen other monarchies tumble around them, and 
having used discontent itself to win power. 
The Sauds base their legitimacy on being the true 
traditional keepers of Islam, descendants of the 
fanatical Wahhabi sect which expanded its power in the 
peninsula under a banner of religious puritanism. They 
are conscious of the power of radical Islam to motivate 
opposition, especially if other economic or political 
conditions set the stage. 
III 
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It was with some concern, then, that Riyadh witnessed the 
collapse of the Shah in 1979. The Iranian revolution was 
a potential external security disaster (22), altering the 
balance of power in the region, and undermining Saudi 
confidence in the United States' two pillar policy, which 
had become the cornerstone of regional security policy 
after the British pullout. Even more ominous for the 
Saudis, the revolution acted as a beacon, and represented 
tangible evidence of success, for Islamic republicans. 
Late in 1979, a band of 'fundamentalist' and anti-Saud 
fanatics attempted to establish an Islamic republic, 
occupying the Grand Mosque in Mecca before being 
overwhelmed by Saudi security forces. A little later in 
the year, there were violent demonstrations by minority 
Shia groups on the other side of the country. 
Neither of these incidents posed a real threat to Al Saud 
rule (23). Their handling by the Government did, 
however, raise some questions over whether Saudi Arabia's 
political structure was flexible enough ever to reconcile 
its technical, and necess~rily outward-looking, 
modernisation programs with conservative religious 
opposition. The dilemma was acute - the royal family's 
hold onto power was predicated on economic success, but 
it had based its political legitimacy on its Islamic 
credentials. 
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The Mecca Mosque incident exposed. the difficulty faced by 
Riyadh in maintaining its Islamic political legitimacy. 
Right-wing religious detractors were able to demonstrate 
compromises made in the name of progress (for example, 
education of women, use of artificial telecommunication 
devices, corruption, excessive materialism) which were 
slowly undermining the Islamic character of Saudi 
society. The Mecca rebel leader, Juhayman Al Oteibi, 
invoked the new Iranian revolution's contention that 
Islam and any sort of monarchy were inherently 
incompatible. 
The abortive coup in Mecca was not only a conservative 
threat to the regime, but represented a provincial and 
tribal dissatisfaction with rule from Riyadh. Juhayman's 
family were traditional Hejazi leaders, who still 
resented being ruled by a royal family for whom they had 
little respect. Although Riyadh has hardly neglected the 
western part of the country (which includes Mecca and 
Medina, as well as the major port of Jeddah, Red Sea oil 
export terminals, and the strategically sensitive border 
areas next to Yemen), social integration has not kept up 
with the pace of the country's economic development, and 
Riyadh still views the Hejaz with suspicion. 
The incident in Mecca betrayed also inadequacies in Saudi 
internal intelligence gathering, poor military capacity 
(especially by the National Guard) to deal with such 
contingencies, and paralysis in decision-making in Riyadh 
1., 
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when faced with a clash between security interests and 
religious legitimacy (24). 
The almost simultaneous (following the Iranian Shia 
revolution) disturbances by the Shia minority in the oil-
rich east elicited a more measured long-term response 
from Riyadh, even if the immediate reaction by the 
military was a little heavy-handed. Following the 
demonstrations, Riyadh went to some length to strengthen 
the consultative processes in the region. Political 
prisoners were released, and an unpopular Governor 
replaced with a more senior figure in the royal family. 
The central government also increased expenditure on 
local development projects (25). 
Since the Mecca incident, the Saudis have been faced each 
year with potential security problems in Mecca by Islamic 
radicals, predominantly Shia and Iranian inspired, during 
the Hajj season. The history of Shia and Sunni discord 
may be ancient, but in the middle of the conflict between 
an Islamic revolutionary Iran and a secular socialist 
Iraq (which Riyadh was openly supporting financially), 
religious and political tensions were bound to be high 
during the pilgrimage. The single largest clash between 
Saudi security forces and Iranian pilgrims, in July 1987, 
once again, as in 1979, excited no significant anti-Saud 
feeling in the rest of the kingdom, nor did it even 
inspire Shia disturbances in the east (26). 
26 
Martin Kramer, writing in 1987, takes the long historical 
perspective on Shia disturbances at Mecca, noting the 
potential created by the Iranian revolution for a serious 
schism in the Islamic world, but arguing that the Saudi 
Arabian incidents remained isolated because there was 
very little wider interest in a major theological rift. 
While this may be true, it implies that the Saudi royals 
were less concerned by such incidents than they might be. 
Indeed, since 1987, Saudi security concerns have been 
alleviated, by the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the 
end of the Iran-Iraq conflict, and a consequent shift in 
Iranian focus towards improved relations with the West 
(to aid Tehran's post-war reconstruction). More 
recently, these security concerns have been directed 
elsewhere by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (a 
conflict with no serious domestic religious 
implications). 
This does not mean that Riyadh has become complacent over 
internal threats (indeed, its relatively harsh treatment 
of Yemeni and Palestinian 'expatriate workers during the 
Gulf war demonstrates Riyadh's continuing sensitivity). 
There has been little progress in Riyadh towards a 
reconciliation between its role as protector of Islam's 
two holiest shrines, and the inevitable clash when 
pursuit of that role gets in the way of economic change. 
The internal threat may not be as real as the Al Saud 
believe, but it retains a powerful influence over 
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security decision-making. While this influence remains, 
Saudi policy will be heavily guided by domestic religious 
and tribal imperatives. 
On a more optimistic note, the royal family's 
preoccupation with internal security has helped it to be 
responsive to the mood of its subjects. It has avoided 
falling victim to the forces of secular and religious 
change which have created such turmoil in much of the 
rest of the Arab world. Petrodollar wealth, as mentioned 
above, has found its way outside the royal family, 
leading to a high level of general prosperity. There 
are, however, other powerful influences acting for 
internal stability. 
Saudi society is structured well to absorb discontent. 
The Saudi monarchy does not rule by divine right, and the 
monarch is equally subject to the rules of Islam. It is 
"a traditional Islamic system" where the King has no 
claim to divine authority ... and rules by consensus, not 
by whim" (27). The informal consultative process, the 
shura, between governors and governed, helps to ensure 
that policies are based, as far as practicable, on a 
broad-based consensus in the society at large. The 
process not only prevents the Government from taking 
hasty decisions, it also acts as a brake on rivalries 
within the royal family itself (for example, over the 
succession), and assists in dampening subnational 
sentiment. The moves by Riyadh to placate the Shia 
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population in the east played a significant part in 
holding their loyalty during the 1980s. 
The high degree of socio-political stability is founded 
also on a resilient family social structure. The 
Government has encouraged the growth of a professional 
based bureaucracy, which has provided an outlet for non-
royals to achieve power as technocrats. "It would take 
an enormous political or economic disaster seriously to 
undermine" the current structure (28). 
The Saudis have sought to construct their foreign and 
security policies by the same rules familiar to them in 
framing domestic policy. Riyadh has sought to achieve 
consensus among its neighbours before making decisions, 
and has preferred to avoid open confrontation. This has 
occasionally led to Saudi reluctance to move quickly on 
defence related issues, such as permitting foreign bases, 
joining formal alliances, or taking a more pro-Western 
stance in OPEC or the Arab League. For the sake of 
regional consensus, regardless of the advantages of 
superpower patronage, the Saudis have been prepared to 
accept a good deal of Western criticism and, in the case 
of the 1973 oil embargo, direct sabre-rattling by the 
United States in the Gulf. 
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Arms Sales 
The issue of arms sales, from the United States in 
particular, highlights a misunderstanding over what can 
reasonably be expected from Riyadh in security commitment 
to Western strategic interests. Often the United States, 
from a Saudi perspective, sold arms grudgingly only after 
humiliating and unnecessary Congressional debate. Once 
more, Washington's actions have demonstrated a reluctance 
to meet Saudi requirements, while at the same time 
describing the kingdom as a pillar of a new defence 
strategy in the Gulf. 
Under Nixon, "the primary emphasis of the twin pillar 
policy ... had been to establish Iran as the predominant 
military power in the region; sales to ... Saudi Arabia 
... were of less strategic importance" (1). Although 
arms sales to Saudi Arabia rose under the Carter 
Administration, Iran remained Washington's 'prime 
policeman' in the Gulf, receiving the lion's share of 
Congressional approvals for quantity and quality of arms 
sales from the United States. The reasons were clear; 
"in American eyes, sales to the Saudis were aimed more at 
buying political cooperation than structuring security 
arrangements in the Gulf" (2). Sophisticated AWACS 
surveillance aircraft were not offered to Riyadh until 
some three years after their purchase by the Shah. 
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From Riyadh's point of view, the unequal treatment was 
frustrating, and explicable only in terms of the strength 
of the Jewish lobby in Washington. If the United States 
were indeed serious about a two pillar security policy in 
the Gulf, and paid attention to Riyadh's concerns (which 
must have included the growing Iranian capability, even 
if possessed by a 'friendly' regime), arms acquisition 
should have been more straightforward. 
Anthony Cordesman, writing in 1987, was highly critical 
of the way the West handled arms sales to the GCC states. 
One of Cordesman's priorities, understandably, was to 
recommend "ways in which Western arms sales can be 
coordinated to enhance US power projection capabilities" 
(3) in the Gulf. However, he is also aware of the long-
term strategic benefit of meeting the Saudis' legitimate 
arms requirements. Commenting on the pressures placed on 
the United States to "take sides" in Middle East 
disputes, he wrote : 
The resulting lack of balance and the failure to 
meet Saudi Arabia's arms needs has been a costly 
case in point. There are legitimate security issues 
involved in arms sales to the Gulf, and the 
technical and military trade-offs in providing Saudi 
Arabia with the air power it needs are complex and 
require careful judgement. At the same time, the 
myth that Saudi Arabia is likely to become a major 
military threat to Israel serves no one's interest. 
It ignores the consequences of the US not providing 
the arms Saudi Arabia ' needs, it ignores the true 
impact of the moderate and conservative Arab states 
on the Arab-Israeli balance, and it ignores the 
importance of Western ties to both the Arab states 
and Israel in reducing the risks of another Arab-
Israeli conflict (4). 
31 
While laying the blame mostly with the United States for 
failure to "build sound Western strategic relations with 
Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states", Cordesman was 
also critical of the lack of effort made by the GCC to 
achieve weapons systems standardisation with US forces, 
while at the same time the GCC states turned to the 
United States for protection whenever Iran appeared 
menacing (5). 
This is the crux of the problem, and explains why even 
Saudi Arabia and Oman, which Cordesman believes "have 
generally accepted the reality of their strategic 
situation, ... have often been erratic in looking beyond 
a given procurement or force planning issue" (6). In the 
end, the GCC states have relied upon Washington coming to 
the rescue, and have avoided the difficult decisions 
associated with creating a sophisticated collective 
deterrent. 
In particular, several arms requests from the Gulf states 
have resulted in their distrust of American intentions, 
and led them to look elsewhere for more "reliable" 
suppliers, thereby compounding the problem of weapons 
systems incompatibility (7). The sales of Stinger 
missiles to Kuwait in 1984 and F-15 aircraft to Saudi 
Arabia the following year were blocked by pro-Israel 
lobbying in Congress (8), leading to Kuwaiti overtures to 
Moscow, and the eventual acquisition by Saudi Arabia of 
Tornados from the United Kingdom. 
~ 
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Charles Kupchan assesses that the United States 
viewed limited arms sales to the Saudis as a means of 
I ~1 
"regaining some of the political leverage lost by the 
II Western oil companies" after 1973, and a conscious 
effort, despite official US denials, to influence 
directly the Saudi position on production and pricing in 
OPEC (9). This would have provided the Saudis with yet 
another reason to diversify arms acquisitions, and to shy 
away from developing a more integrated pro-United States 
defence system on the peninsula. 
1\ To be fair, as Cordesman acknowledges, the US 
Administration found itself in a bind over its political 
need to support Israel, and its post-1979 rush to make up 
for years of negligence in Gulf security planning (10). 
The 1985-1986 arms sale fiasco demonstrated the 
complexities facing the United States in devising 
III 
palatable policies, but it highlighted also the danger of 
trying to please too many parties at once. 
I" 
Cordesman notes that the major problem facing the Reagan 
:1 Administration in its proposed sale of F-15s to Riyadh 
was that "it had seriously miscalculated the effort it 
would have to put into getting Congressional support for 
1,111 the sale ... of being willing to pay the price of a long 
and grueling [sic] political battle" (11). 
I ~ 
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Both the proposed sales to Saudi Arabia and Jordan led to 
calls in Washington for a "linkage" between them and 
progress in the Middle East peace negotiations. The 
opposition in Washington to the sales, and in general to 
"US strategic relations with Saudi Arabia" eventually 
killed the deal, when the Administration had virtually 
assured King Fahd that it would go ahead (12). 
Cordesman concludes that it was domestic bungling by the 
Reagan Administration which led to the loss of the 
fighter sale to Britain. For the Saudis, the 
complexities of American political lobbying practice did 
not excuse the US from reneging on strategic 
undertakings. 
The United States 
In general, United States policy in the Gulf since the 
British pUll-out in 1971 has been relatively 
unsophisticated. At its simplest, the United States 
inherited a responsibility with which it had little close 
knowledge, unlike the UK which had been operating in the 
area for over three hundred years. J E Peterson 
characterised US policy in the 1970s as "benign 
inaction", and for the years after the Iranian revolution 
as "overreaction" (13). 
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united States policy in the 1970s was driven largely by 
its experience in Vietnam, in the wake of which President 
Nixon sought to minimize "the role of the United States 
as a world policeman" (14). - The twin pillar policy was 
in reality an abrogation of responsibility in a region 
which, although of vital interest to the United States, 
seemed beyond Washington's diplomatic skills. 
The change to the activist Carter Doctrine, in response 
to the cataclysmic regional events at the end of the 
1970s, led to the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force 
(RDF) and a renewed US commitment to the region (at a 
time also of sharp deterioration in East-West relations) 
( 15) . 
But since the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, US policy 
towards the conflict has been inconsistent, and a source 
of concern to the Gulf states. The Reagan 
Administration, following the resumption of diplomatic 
relations with Baghdad in 1984; threatened the Iranians 
with military retaliation if they attacked neutral 
vessels in the Gulf. But no such warning was given to 
the Iraqis, who attacked shipping almost with impunity; 
the US Navy protected ships in the south of the Gulf, but 
did not escort tankers heading for the northern Iranian 
terminal at Kharg Island. 
Washington also applauded the Saudi downing of two 
Iranian fighters in 1984, an incident which, far from 
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being praiseworthy "could have precipitated a major 
crisis and expansion of the Gulf war" (16). 
A number of other specific incidents stand out as 
testimony to the narrowness of US policy towards the war. 
In 1987, the USS Stark incident, when an American frigate 
was hit by Iraqi Exocet missiles, only produced 
additional anti-Iranian invective from Washington. Yet 
at the same time the United States was involved in the 
'Irangate' arms sale to Tehran. And even when an 
American cruiser shot down an Iranian civilian airliner 
in 1988, a short American expression of regret was 
followed by statements justifying the US action (17). 
In Iran, the United States continually re-invented an 
enemy to justify its "overreactive" policy change in the 
Gulf after the revolution; "rooted in a policy-setting 
characterised by tunnel vision and historical amnesia, 
Reagan's strategy has certainly strengthened the USA's 
military posture and force-projection capabilities in the 
Persian Gulf but without blending that military strategy 
into a coherent diplomatic strategy" (18). 
It is difficult to see how the lower Gulf states, despite 
their support of Iraq in the war, would have been 
reassured by Washington's blundering - it was quiet 
diplomacy in Riyadh and Tehran which prevented the Saudi-
Iranian air clash in 1984 from escalating. 
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Gulf Cooperation Council 
R K Ramazani notes the creation of the GCC was the 
product of an "extraordinary mixture of circumstances 
within one year's time [which] crystallized a consensus 
on the need for regional cooperation among the six 
monarchies" (19). Ramazani suggests that it is 
simplistic to suggest that the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq 
war was the main catalyst in forming the Council, and 
that other factors were equally important in galvanising 
opinion towards greater regional cooperation. 
Ramazani identifies four major "challenges" which caused 
the Gulf Arab states to get together; "the Iranian 
revolution, particularly the threat of subversion; the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the superpower 
competition, including unilateral American military 
intervention; and the threat of spillover from the Iraq-
Iran war" (20). 
Riyadh was especially concerned by the apparent inability 
or unwillingness of the United States to prop-up its 
erstwhile regional ally. Initially, though, there was 
considerable resistance, especially from Kuwait, for the 
GCC to incorporate defence cooperation. The trouble 
experienced over the last decade by the GCC states in 
developing defence cooperation was due largely to 
differences among them over the object of such a regime. 
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As noted above, Kuwait had stronger links than any other 
GCC state with the Soviet Union and, for example, the UAE 
had (and still has) longstanding territorial disputes 
with Iran (21). So long as Gulf leaders were divided 
over the purpose of their strategic alliance, uniform 
defence policy eluded them. Instead, a series of 
bilateral agreements with Saudi Arabia have been 
concluded, again not necessarily conducive to regional 
cooperation. Such agreements did, however, have the 
advantage of cutting the United States formally out of a 
regional defence agreement - the public enthusiasm from 
Washington for the GCC made leaders wary of shifting too 
close to the American camp. 
A powerful disincentive for Gulf states to accept the 
overt reliance upon the United States was the perception 
that it was precisely the Shah's dependence on Washington 
which had hastened his downfall. Also, the US sponsored 
Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel were seen to 
have undermined President Sadat's position in Egypt, 
leading to a resurgence of the radical Muslim Brotherhood 
there and Sadat's subsequent assassination. To avoid too 
intimate a connection with Washington, Saudi Arabia even 
went so far as to actively purchase other states' non-
involvement with the United States (22). 
Essentially, "political divisions within the GCC 
prevented the Saudis from achieving the degree of 
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regional defense cooperation that they had been seeking" 
(23). The Saudis were keen to maintain and develop their 
position as the chief partner in the Gee relationship, 
but became hesitant in the 1980s to move closer to the 
United States, for fear of having the entire organisation 
branded an American puppet. Additionally, "the United 
States had failed to recognize the extent to which the 
erosion of the moderate camp [in the Arab World] made it 
difficult for the Saudis to risk close military 
cooperation" (24). 
Ramazani's analysis concludes on a pessimistic note; 
"considering the deeper challenge of developing a sense 
of national identity in individual countries, it is 
difficult to envisage a sense of Gee identity among the 
people any time in the near future, whether the rulers 
aim at creating a confederation or something else as a 
vehicle for their cooperation" (25). 
So, the "challenges" which led to the creation of the 
Gee, and the fear which these instilled in the ruling 
royal families, coupled with the continuing Iran-Iraq 
conflict, were not sufficient to overcome more deep-
seated and immediate priorities. 
That progress has been glacial and often more decorative 
than real, underscores a policy paralysis which has still 
to be addressed head~on. The Gee has achieved so little 
because, in the final analysis, none of the ruling 
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families, including the Saudis, have ever tackled 
comprehensively the issues involved in forming a regional 
deterrent. To be credible, such a deterrent would 
require a high level of political motivation, and 
technical expertise and cooperation. This could lead to 
the formation of a military establishment which might 
challenge the power of its founders before confronting 
external security problems. 
The Carter Doctrine 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was seen in Washington 
as a direct threat to the oil lifeline through the 
Straits of Hormuz at the entrance to the Gulf. In his 
1980 State of the Union Address, President Carter warned 
the Soviets : "Let our position be perfectly clear: An 
attempt by any outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the 
vital interests of the United States. It will be 
repelled by use of any means necessary, including 
military force" (26). 
The Gulf states (except Oman which had its own reasons 
for, and history of, close defence cooperation with the 
West) greeted Carter's statement with dismay - they had 
consistently been opposed to outside military 
intervention in the region, especially the permanent 
basing of foreign military forces there. The thrust of 
.~ 
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the Gulf states' reaction was that security was the 
responsibility of the states themselves, and that they 
were not prepared to turn the area into a battleground 
:1 between the superpowers (27). 
~ I 
But despite the rhetoric . of self-reliance, the Gulf 
II 
rulers had little detailed idea of how to go about 
~ protecting the area. When the Iran-Iraq conflict 
escalated in 1984 into attacks on oil tankers, the Gee 
was "goaded ... to work even harder toward developing an 
integrated defense system" (28). The previous year the 
Gee had commenced its regular "Peninsular Shield" 
exercises, but it did not amount to much more than "a 
venture more satisfying on paper than in reality" (29). 
Writers such as Zbigniew Brzezinski have viewed the Gulf 
primarily in terms of a "geostrategic focal point of 
global significance", and have devised doctrines aimed 
exclusively at containing the Soviets, with only passing 
regard to the impact of global strategic theory on local 
III 
strategic realities (30). 
I·i 
However, the strategic perspectives of the Gulf states 
have their roots deep in regional history, which is 
replete with intense competition between immediate 
neighbours. Their view of the rest of the world has been 
coloured by the early relationship with the UK (31). 
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It should corne as no surprise then that by the mid-1980s, 
Ii the GCC states were providing substantial support to 
Iraq, effectively paying Baghdad to fight a war for them. 
lei For the GCC states, the prospect of a hostile Shia 
hegemony in southern Iraq (on the border of Saudi 
Arabia's largest Shia province) was unthinkable. Tehran 
had already openly questioned the religious/political 
legitimacy of the regime in Riyadh. Paying the Iraqis 
II 
was easier than risking direct Iranian attack by 
appearing too much of a threat themselves. 
Baghdad was used as a mercenary by the Gulf Arab states, 
which were so preoccupied with the Iranian revolutionary 
threat, that they failed to appreciate fully the dangers 
posed by a secular Ba'athist state in Iraq. Iraq had 
never fully accepted Kuwaiti independence, and had 
nothing in common with what it saw as corrupt and 
anachronistic theocracies lower down the Gulf. 
I 
Nonetheless, a substantial commitment by the GCC to 
common defence strategy would have become increasingly 
attractive as the military disparity between the GCC and 
its northern neighbours deepened. 
It The GCC states were, however, careful to minimise the 
inevitable negative reactions from both Baghdad and 
Tehran to their plans of defence cooperation - military 
cooperation was not included in the Council's original 
I~ charter. By the end of 1981, the . GCC started to discuss 
I~ 
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openly defence matters (and internal security, following 
the abortive Iranian-backed coup attempt in Bahrain in 
December) (32). 
The Gulf rapid deployment force, albeit a gesture towards 
defence cooperation, was hamstrung by a lack of military 
coordination, and also by a need to adopt a low profile 
in the face, for example, of Soviet protests over the 
AWACS sale, or Iranian hostility over US military 
cooperation with Oman (33). Not given to risk-taking in 
defence policy, the GCC states were never able to develop 
a preparedness beyond one "aimed at the lower end of 
regional threat scenarios" (34). 
For the whole of the 1980s, the GCC remained divided over 
its relations with the superpowers (35), and therefore 
incapable of pursuing much more than reactive policies. 
The failure of the GCC to met US strategic hopes, yet 
move much more quickly and successfully on other forms of 
cooperation (for example currency exchange and border 
controls), should have sent a clear message to 
Washington. What Anthony Cordesman described wishfully 
in 1987 as "slow but steady progress towards creating a 
collective regional security structure" (36), was in 
reality an indication of the limits to which Gulf states 
were prepared to go, or politically capable of going, 
towards regional defence (as opposed to internal security 
arrangements) just to suit Western strategic interests. 
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This is not to say that GCC and Western security 
interests in the Gulf do not to a large extent converge, 
as Cordesman and others eagerly point out. But when 
progress is slow, or Gulf policies seem perhaps a little 
ambiguous, or inconsistent with Western interests (for 
example, Saudi Arabia's funding of Syria's military 
build-up in the 1980s), it may be more appropriate to 
look for the regional imperatives behind the policy (what 
Cordesman calls, in the Syrian example, "Saudi 
weakness" ) . 
Israel 
Late in 1979, President Reagan pledged his unequivocal 
support for Israel as "America's trusted ally" in the 
Middle East, at the same time drawing an unflattering 
comparison with the reliability and worth of Saudi Arabia 
and the other Gulf states (37). By the time of the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and also in view of 
the US-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on 
strategic cooperation signed the previous year, life was 
being made hard for Gulf states to move much further on 
defence cooperation with the United States. 
Since 1967, the close US relationship with Israel has 
impeded the construction of really close and overt 
defence links between Washington and the Gulf, although 
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the issue assumed greater urgency in Washington as the UK 
withdrew from the Trucial States in 1971. Soviet 
influence in the region increased (notably in Ethiopia 
and then South Yemen, and also through Moscow's 
relatively good relations with Kuwait), culminating in 
1979 with the invasion of Afghanistan, putting further 
pressure on the United States to heighten its presence in 
the Gulf. 
Although Gulf States had never accepted the level of US 
support for Israel, it was the humiliating defeat of Arab 
armies in 1967, the loss of Arab lands, and the further 
dispossession of the Palestinian people, which added to 
the difficulties experienced by the Gulf states in openly 
accepting of US protection. 
A number of factors have a bearing on Riyadh's difficulty 
in coming to terms with its security dependence on 
Israel's closest ally. There is no other single issue 
over which all Arab states agree than their opposition to 
Israel. Before the Gulf war, Palestinians made up a 
large proportion of the expatriate Gulf workforce - and 
Saudi public commitment to their cause was absolute. 
The Saudis, as guardians of Mecca and Medina, could not 
risk being seen to accept the Israeli occupation of 
Islam's third holiest city, East Jerusalem (and Tel 
Aviv's subsequent annexation of it). Although the United 
States did not accept the Israeli annexation, and does 
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not accept the legitimacy of Israeli occupation of the 
territory seized in 1967, Washington placed little 
pressure on Israel before the Gulf war to accept, in 
particular, United Nations Resolution 242 and the 
principle of 'land-for-peace'. Diplomatic niceties 
aside, the view from the Gulf was that the United States 
had acquiesced in the Israeli possession of Palestinian 
lands. 
Iran 
As noted above, even before the Iranian revolution, the 
Gulf Arab states may have had some cause to be concerned 
over United States reliance on Iran as its major ally in 
the Gulf. 
For some time after the revolution and the start of the 
Iran-Iraq war, the rhetoric from Tehran was 
uncompromising towards the Gulf, threatening to "turn off 
all the oil taps in the Persian Gulf" if its own exports 
were stopped (38). By the mid-1980s, however, Tehran 
appeared to be softening its line; during a tour of the 
Gulf in early 1986, an Iranian presidential envoy 
declared that Iran had "no covetous eye on Iraqi 
territory and it has high respect for the Persian Gulf 
littoral states" (39). 
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Although a few overtures from Tehran did not cause the 
Gee states to cease their support for Iraq, the provision 
of American arms to Tehran at this time "in close 
cooperation with Israel ... suggested, at best, that the 
United States was insensitive to their security concerns" 
(40). This extraordinary development must have confused 
the Gee leaders who, although in no doubt of the US 
commitment to protect Gulf oil supplies, were now even 
more unsure of Washington's long term goals in the 
region. 
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The conservative Gulf regimes, haunted by the spectres of 
secular rebellions in Yemen, Libya, Egypt and Islamic 
revolution in Iran, all against established conservative 
monarchies, found themselves incapable of developing 
defence policies which might call into question their own 
legitimacy - by aligning themselves with the West. To 
admit their weaknesses in relation to the regional 
superpowers of Iran and Iraq would have undermined their 
national legitimacy and provided a fertile breeding 
ground for secular and fundamentalist extremist 
dissidents. 
There was a continually uneasy feeling in the Gulf over 
being seen to move closer to the West, while at the same 
time opposing the Israeli occupation of lands taken in 
the 1967 war. To devise a truly competent anti-Iran, 
anti-Iraq, defence force would have been to move the Gulf 
states squarely into the Western military camp and, 
despite that being more ideologically palatable than 
normalising relations with, or courting an atheistic and 
revolutionary Soviet Union, it could never be admitted 
publicly. 
The GCC might toy with the idea of an effective rapid 
deployment force, and urge greater military integration, 
but it has been hamstrung from formulating an effective 
common defence policy. 
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Firstly there was a split in its own ranks about the 
strategic direction the region should be going. Oman's 
concern over the security of the Straits of Hormuz, and 
its willingness to work closely with the United States, 
(in the 1970s even letting in the Shah's army to help put 
down a local rebellion) underscores the diversity of 
views from one end of the peninsula to the other (where 
Kuwait had a much closer relationship with the Soviet 
Union). 
Secondly, the area was riddled by territorial and other 
disputes, partly left over from the days of British 
cartographical imprecision, but also the result of 
resource and population distribution, as well as 
religious, tribal and economic jealousies. In the area 
of security policy, the former Trucial States had relied 
entirely upon the protection of the United Kingdom from 
extra-regional interference in their affairs. But the 
protection had also kept a lid on local tensions. 
The West's approach to Gulf security in this period after 
the British withdrawal in 1971 failed not just because it 
left a power vacuum, but because all attempts to fill the 
vacuum were unable to get the Gulf states to give up 
publicly, as they had previously, all their defence and 
security policy responsibilities to one foreign 
protector. 
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The Gulf has been told to manage its own security, but 
within ill-defined and nebulous limits dictated not, as 
in the days of British rule, by a single imperative to 
maintain imperial hegemony, but by the employment of a 
shifting set of parameters which have never given the 
Gulf states a clear definition of what or what not they 
are supposed to be responsible for. 
On the one hand, they have been encouraged towards 
greater independence, political moderation and regional 
cooperation, while on the other left to guess the nature, 
direction and intent of Western policy. 
The West seems to have learnt little over the past two 
decades; it has exhibited neither the necessary political 
will nor sought to develop the economic wherewithal to 
wean itself off dependence on Gulf oil supplies. 
Equally, it has failed to develop a sophisticated 
appreciation of the policy priorities, and methodology, 
of the Gulf sheikhdoms and Saudi Arabia. 
A decade ago, William Quandt argued persuasively in 
favour of a convergence of interests, based on a closer 
understanding between Riyadh and Washington. But 
Washington remains dependent on Saudi oil for economic 
prosperity, and Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf states, 
will continue to hesitate to aid the West's strategic 
security interests while they need to attend first to 
their own. 
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So, the prospects for more viable security arrangements 
in the Gulf seem as bleak now as they did in 1971, not 
only because there continue to be fundamental 
disagreements over how to put them in place, but also 
because "essentially the root causes of political 
instability ... are just as strong as they have been for 
the last three decades" (1). 
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